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ABSTRACT
I study a small open economy in which elections affect and are affected by capital inflows. Two
candidates, one favoring workers and another favoring entrepreneurs, run for office; the winner
chooses taxes, which affect investment returns. A pro labor victory results in a "sudden stop" in
investment and capital flows, reflecting a time inconsistency problem. The pro business candidate
is free from time inconsistency but becomes less attractive to voters if the foreign debt is larger.
Hence electoral outcomes depends on the size of the debt, which itself depends on expectations
about the election. The model's politico economic equilibria has several implications. Politico
economic links exacerbate the responses of financial variables to exogenous shocks. Self fulfilling
equilibria may exist. Policies that alleviate the pro labor candidate's commitment problem contribute
to financial stability but also, and perhaps more surprisingly, to the chances of a pro labor victory






New Brunswick, NJ 08901
and NBER
chang@econ.rutgers.eduElectoral Uncertainty and the Volatility of
International Capital Flows
Roberto Chang
Rutgers University and NBER
This version: July 2006
1. Introduction
Three recent Latin American episodes have underscored that ﬁnancial volatility
is often strongly associated with electoral uncertainty and distributional conﬂict.
The ﬁrst episode was the 2002 presidential election in Brazil. Figure 1 shows the
behavior of the risk premia on Brazilian debt, as given by J.P. Morgan’s EMBI
spreads, between 2001 and 2005.1 Clearly, the period was dominated by the
run up in the spreads associated with the 2002 election: during the summer of
2002, Brazilian risk premia surpassed 2000 basis points. Figure 1 also plots the
Global EMBI spread for the period, which makes clear that Brazil’s phenomena
was driven by country speciﬁc factors. In fact, there is evidence that the spread
movements were closely correlated with increases in the popularity of the pro labor
candidate, Lula de Silva, among voters (Javier Santiso 2003). That evidence and
Figure 1 strongly suggest that politico economic issues are not only helpful but
critical to understand the behavior of capital ﬂows to Brazil since the millennium.
A second episode is given by the April 2006 Peruvian election. Figure 2 plots
the diﬀerence between Peru’s EMBI spread and the Global EMBI spread since
January 2005. While not as dramatic as the Brazilian example, Figure 2 shows
that the ascent of a "populist" candidate, Ollanta Humala, as a leading contender
in Peru’s elections was noticeably associated with a drastic increase in Peru’s risk
premia (see Luis Oganes and And´ res Ortiz 2005 for a discussion).
1Figures can be found at the end of the paper.The third example is the December 2005 election in Bolivia, won by the leader
of the peasants, Evo Morales. The Morales victory was preceded by the antic-
ipation of populist economic measures and the collapse of international capital
inﬂows: net FDI inﬂows fell by almost four percent of GDP in 2005.2 And, in
fact, the fears proved warranted, as Morales announced, in May 2006, the nation-
alization of oil and gas contracts with multinational corporations. 3
It is not hard to ﬁnd other examples in which elections seem to have disrupted
capital markets. 4 And indeed some econometric evidence exists that supports
the view that there is a systematic connection between elections and ﬁnancial
vulnerability (see, for instance, Matthieu Bussiere and Christian Mulder 1999).
The three Latin American cases just mentioned, and surely others, share some
salient features. In each case, international capital inﬂows became dearer and
more scarce in anticipation of an election. And each election was marked by the
surge in the popularity of candidates regarded as less market friendly.
The observed retreat of international inﬂows before the elections was, in some
sense, not too surprising. Foreign investors are forward looking, and expected
investment returns may be aﬀected by policies to be enacted by the winner of an
upcoming election. Hence ﬁnancial outcomes are naturally driven by expectations
about future elections.
But another, less prominent feature of these cases is that the behavior of
international capital ﬂows may have, in turn, aﬀected the electoral outcomes.
This possibility seems to have been overlooked in the academic debate, yet was
widely acknowledged, at least implicitly. The belief that ﬁnancial variables may
have aﬀected elections was, perhaps, most clearly evident in statements about the
political impact of international ﬁnancial assistance packages. For instance, after
the IMF approved a US$ 30 bn. assistance package to Brazil in August 2002, the
New York Times said "The IMF Loan was carefully structured to aﬀect Brazil’s
2IMF data show that net FDI inﬂows, as percent of GDP, were 8.3 in 2000, 8.2 in 2001, 8.5 in
2002, 2.4 in 2003, 0.7 in 2004, and -3.0 in 2005. The fall in 2003 and 2004 may have been itself
motivated by the political unrest surrounding the collapse of the Sánchez de Losada government
at the end of 2003. This fall, however, was not associated with electoral periods, which is the
f o c u so ft h i sp a p e r .
3“Companies had been holding oﬀ on investments in Bolivia for some time, unnerved by
growing talk of precisely the kind of step that Mr. Morales took this week. Foreign direct
investment, much of which goes to energy and mining, fell to $103 million in 2005, from $1
billion in 1999.” (NY Times, May 3 2006)
4Korea in 1997-98 immediately comes to mind (Stephan Haggard 2000).
2upcoming elections." 5
Hence understanding the links between international capital ﬂows and elections
calls for a theory allowing for elections to aﬀect international capital ﬂows but also
for capital ﬂows to aﬀect electoral equilibria. This paper is an attempt to develop
one such theory and to derive its implications for observable variables and for
public policy.
I focus on a small open economy in which entrepreneurs and workers are about
to elect a government. There are two electoral candidates, one "pro business"
and the other "pro labor," whose objectives are respectively biased towards en-
trepreneurs or workers.
Entrepreneurs are assumed to have access to an investment which can only
be ﬁnanced with the help of foreign lenders. The electoral outcome matters for
the investment decision because the incoming government will choose tax policy
and hence inﬂuence the proﬁtability of the investment. Hence, debt contracts,
economic allocations and decisions, and the cost of credit, will all depend on the
probability distribution of the electoral outcome.
Crucially, the pro labor candidate suﬀers from a time inconsistency or capital
levy problem: given his social preferences, he cannot commit, before the elections,
not to impose excessively high taxes on investment returns if elected. Hence,
under conditions identiﬁed in the analysis, a pro labor victory in the elections
results in a halt to external ﬁnancing or, using Guillermo Calvo’s (1998) term, a
sudden stop. In contrast, the pro business candidate is assumed to be suﬃciently
biased in favor of entrepreneurs that, for the same reasons as Kenneth Rogoﬀ’s
(1985) "conservative central banker," he can eﬀectively commit to low capital
taxes; hence a pro business victory results in low capital income taxes and the
continuation of capital inﬂows. The analysis underscores that electoral uncertainty
is in fact crucial to observe ﬁnancial volatility. In the absence of elections, a sudden
5"IMF Loan to Brazil also shields US Interests," New York Times, August 9, page C1.
Another illustration is found in the Op-Ed page if the NY Times at the time of the Bolivian
case: “This is simply the way democracy sometimes works. Oil and gas nationalization has been
the main political issue in Bolivia for the last several years. Mr. Morales, an Aymara Indian
farmer, won a landslide victory in December on a promise to nationalize the gas industry. Now
he’s delivering on that promise he made to the country’s nine million citizens...The majority of
Bolivians support nationalization out of acute frustration over two decades of failed "neoliberal"
policies by the International Monetary Fund, which tied sorely needed loans to privatization,
debt reduction and relaxation of labor standards. “ (William Powers, “All Smoke and No Fire
in Bolivia,” NY Times May 6) For the Peruvian election, however, the rise of Ollanta Humala
in the polls is more of a mystery. See Oganes and Ortiz 2005.
3stop cannot be observed: either investment projects do not get oﬀ the ground and
foreign capital does not come at all, or the ﬂow of foreign capital is stable.
Perhaps the most novel and consequential aspect of the model is that not
only does electoral uncertainty aﬀect the debt problem, but also debt contracts
aﬀect electoral outcomes. A larger debt makes the pro business candidate less
attractive to voters relative to the pro labor candidate. The reason is simple. If
the pro labor candidate wins the elections, investments come to a halt; conversely,
investment returns are reaped and debt payments made only after a pro business
victory. Therefore a larger debt reduces the entrepreneurs’ payoﬀ conditional on
a pro business victory while leaving unaﬀected that payoﬀ conditional on a pro
labor victory.
Hence, under natural assumptions on voting behavior, the model leads to
the simultaneous determination of the size of the debt, credit spreads, and the
probability distribution of the electoral outcome. I characterize the resulting
politico-economic equilibria and its implications. One ﬁnding is that the response
of endogenous variables to exogenous shocks may be multiplied by the politico-
economic links. An increase in the world interest rate, for instance, increases the
cost of credit not only directly, but also through its eﬀect on electoral outcomes
and policy uncertainty, which determine the credit spread. The model therefore
explains why electoral periods may be associated with increased sensitivity to
exogenous shocks.
A related implication is that there may be multiple equilibria and associated
self fulﬁlling politico economic crises. Heightened expectations of a pro labor
victory increase the cost of credit, the debt problem, and the relative popularity of
the pro labor candidate, and may lead to a shift from a good to a bad equilibrium.
In such a case, the expectations of the world capital market are key in determining
both capital inﬂows and political outcomes.
The analysis suggests a number of useful lessons for policy. A pre electoral
commitment by both candidates to implement a "market friendly" tax policy
helps stabilizing capital ﬂows by eliminating the pro labor candidate’s time in-
consistency problem. In addition, and more surprisingly, such a commitment has
a nontrivial eﬀect on the elections: the likelihood of a pro labor victory increases.
The reason is, simply, that such an agreement makes the two candidates more sim-
ilar to each other from the viewpoint of voters. More generally, I argue that any
policy that helps overcoming the commitment problem of the pro labor candidate
is likely to enhance international capital ﬂows and, at the same time, to increase
the probability of a pro labor victory in the elections. Hence, and in particular,
4t h ev i e wt h a tI M Fp a c k a g e so ro t h e rﬁnancial assistance programs have a signif-
icant impact on domestic politics turns out to be justiﬁed in the context of this
model. But, perhaps unexpectedly for that view’s proponents, the main political
beneﬁciaries are likely to be those parties perceived as least market friendly.
Finally, the model allows for the analysis of the role of wealth redistribution on
politico economic outcomes. This may be of interest because it has been argued
that the recent resurgence of populism in Latin America can be explained by the
failure of "Washington consensus" policies to reduce income and wealth inequal-
ity.6 I identify precise conditions under which wealth redistribution does indeed
reduce the probability of sudden stops and the cost of foreign credit. The result is
that the impact of inequality on politico economic equilibrium is ambiguous and
depends primarily on the distribution of exogenous political noise.
Previous theoretical eﬀorts at understanding the interaction between politics
and the volatility of international capital ﬂows are hard to ﬁnd. In Chang (2005) I
recently presented an analysis of links between ﬁnancial crises and political crises.
That paper, however, does not emphasize the important role of elections, which
are central here. The modeling approach in this paper borrows many elements
from the literatures on time consistency as well as political economics. For mas-
terful summaries of both, see Allan Drazen (2000) and Torsten Persson and Guido
Tabellini (2000).
The model is consistent with the recent empirical work of Daron Acemoglu,
Simon Johnson, James Robinson, and Yunyong Thaicharoen (2003) regarding the
impact of institutions on macroeconomic volatility. Acemoglu et al. argued, in
particular, that volatility is negatively related with a measure of constraints on
the executive. Clearly, there is a close connection between that measure and the
mechanisms emphasizes here: as already mentioned, a key distortion in my model
is that candidates cannot be constrained to honor any promises made before taking
power.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the environment and in-
dividual behavior, given economic policy and the probability distribution of elec-
toral outcomes. Section 3 discusses the determination of the elected government’s
policy and the associated economic equilibria, still taking as given the political
outcome distribution. Section 4 then analyzes voting behavior and the simul-
taneous determination of political and economic outcomes. Section 5 examines
6"One big reason for populism’s persistence is the extreme inequality in the region. That
reduces the appeal of incremental reform and increases that of messianic leaders who promise a
new world. " ( "The return of populism, " The Economist, April 12th 2006.)
5some policy implications. Section 6 extends the analysis in two directions. In the
base model, it is assumed that factor rewards are exogenous constants. This is
dropped in subsection 6.1, where factor rewards are derived endogenously from a
neoclassical production function. In subsection 6.2 the assumption that agents are
either entrepreneurs or workers is dropped. Instead, it is assumed that all agents
both work and invest, although they may diﬀer in the size of the projects they
may undertake. The results of the base model are extended to this case, which in
addition allows for the analysis of the impact of wealth redistribution. Section 7
concludes.
2. The Environment
Consider a small open economy populated by a continuum of entrepreneurs and
workers who elect a government during the timeframe of analysis. The size of the
population is normalized to one, and the number of entrepreneurs as a fraction of
the total population is denoted by χ. There is a preelectoral period (t =0 )a n da
post election period (t =1 ), and only one good, which is freely traded and costs
one unit of an international currency (dollar)i nt h ew o r l dm a r k e t .
Elections take place at the end of period 0. There is a ”pro business” candidate
and a ”pro labor” opponent. At the end of period 1, the newly elected government
must pick a ﬁscal package (a combination of taxes on capital income and labor
income) in order to ﬁnance an exogenous level of expenditure G.
In this section we study the environment and the behavior of individual en-
trepreneurs and workers, who take as given the probability of each candidate’s
electoral victory as well as the policy chosen by the electoral winner. The endoge-
nous determination of these variables will be the central subject of later sections.
2.1. Entrepreneurs
The representative entrepreneur has access to an investment project that requires
an initial outlay of κ dollars at t =0 . Immediately after observing the electoral
outcome, at the beginning of period 1, the project can be discontinued at no
further cost. If the project is nevertheless continued, an additional λκ dollars
must be added in order to keep the project alive; in that case the project returns
Rκ dollars at the end of period 1.7
7The investment technology is hence a simpliﬁe dv e r s i o no ft h a ti nB e n g tH o l m s t r o ma n d
Jean Tirole (1997).
6Both λ and R are exogenous constants. This means, in particular, that the
ﬁnal return to investment, R, is independent of other aggregate variables. But this
is only for ease of exposition: section 6 extends our analysis to the case in which
R is derived, in general equilibrium, from a neoclassical production function.
The entrepreneur is risk neutral, maximizes expected consumption in period
1, and has no initial funds. To ﬁnance investment, he seeks funding from the
international capital market, represented here by a continuum of risk neutral
foreign investors. The safe dollar interest rate between periods 0 and 1 is ρ ≥ 0.
The entrepreneur is assumed to design a loan contract that maximizes his
expected ﬁnal consumption subject to providing foreign investors with an expected
return no less than the world interest rate.8 Contracts are assumed to be fully
enforceable but they must respect limited liability: at any point, the entrepreneur
cannot pay more than he has then.
It is easy to see that, in the absence of other distortions, the investment would
be made if
R − λ ≥ 1+ρ.
However, the contracting problem is complicated by the possibility of taxation:
the government may require taxes to be paid on the investment return. From the
viewpoint of the contract, taxes are the only source of uncertainty, and their real-
ization becomes known at the beginning of period 1, when the electoral outcome
is realized. The sequence of events is as follows:
[INSERT TIMELINE HERE]
Note that investors decide whether or not to continue the project immediately
upon observing the outcome of the elections. In contrast, the electoral winner can
enact tax policy only upon taking power, at the end of period 1.
A contract between the entrepreneur and foreign investors must stipulate
whether the project is started, whether the project continues after observing the
electoral outcome and, if so, how the after tax return on the investment is dis-
tributed. To characterize the optimal contract, consider the investment continu-
ation decision at the start of period 1. Suppose that the pro business candidate
has won the election and is expected to impose a tax on capital income at rate
τ = τb. Then continuing the project is eﬃcient if
(1 − τb)R ≥ λ (2.1)
8Note that loan contracts are assumed to be endogenous and optimal, so nothing in the
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and consume. 
t = 0 t = 1
Sequence of EventsWe will focus on sudden stop equilibria in which this requirement is satisﬁed,
and hence investment projects and capital inﬂows continue after a pro business
victory in the elections. In contrast, if the pro labor candidate wins the elections,
in equilibrium he imposes such a large capital tax rate that it is eﬃcient for
projects to be discontinued.9
Because of limited liability, the payment to foreign investors after a pro labor
victory can only be zero. Let d denote the payment promised to foreign investors
if the pro business candidate wins the election, or debt for short. If investment
projects are to be ﬁnanced at t =0 , outside investors must be paid at least their
opportunity cost of funds, which requires that10
p(d − λκ)=( 1+ρ)κ
where p denotes the probability of a pro business victory. Hence the entrepreneur’s
debt is:




Finally, for the project to be started, the entrepreneur must expect a positive
return. This requires, in particular, that the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ after a pro
business victory be nonnegative:
(1 − τb)Rκ − d ≥ 0
(In the event of a pro labor victory, the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ is zero, as the
investment is discontinued.) Inserting 2.2 into the previous inequality we obtain
that the initial investment will be made if:
p[(1 − τb)R − λ] ≥ 1+ρ (2.3)
Summarizing, if 2.3 holds, the entrepreneur and the foreign investors will agree
to invest the κ dollars needed to start the project. In addition, if the pro business
candidate wins the election, foreign investors will add λκ dollars to continue the
project, in whose case they will be repaid d, a sg i v e nb y2 . 2 ,a tt h ee n do fp e r i o d
1. In the event of a pro labor victory, the investment project is cancelled with no
further obligations.
Several aspects of this problem warrant comment. A pro labor victory is fol-
lowed by an investment collapse and a halt in capital ﬂows. Electoral uncertainty
9That is, if τ = τL is the capital tax rate imposed by a pro labor government, (1−τL)R<λ .
10I make the usual assumption that outside investors are held to their reservation value.
8is, in fact, crucial for observing such a sudden stop. If the pro business candidate
is sure to win the election, one would never observe investment projects to be
discontinued. On the other hand, a sure pro labor victory in the elections result
in no projects being started at all.
Perhaps more importantly, the debt d depends inversely on p, the probability
of a pro business victory. This reﬂects the fact that foreign investors lose money
after a pro labor victory. To be compensated for that possible loss, they must
make enough money when the pro business candidate wins the elections.
For purposes of discussion, it may be useful to have a measure of the cost of
credit for this country. A reasonable deﬁnition is given by the debt amount net
of continuation costs, divided by the initial investment:
cost of credit = (d − λκ)/κ − 1=[ ( 1+ρ)/p] − 1
If p were one, then this deﬁnition would give the world interest rate. Obviously,
the diﬀe r e n c eb e t w e e nt h ec o s to fc r e d i ta n dt h ew o r l di n t e r e s tr a t ei san a t u r a l
measure of the credit spread. These deﬁnitions imply that the cost of credit and
the spread fall with p.
Finally, note that an increase in the debt, which may be caused by a fall in p,
reduces the entrepreneurial payoﬀ when a pro business government is elected.
2.2. Workers
Workers produce and consume only at the end of period 1. The typical worker can
produce ﬁnal goods with a constant returns technology: each hour worked results
in W units of output.
The worker takes the return to labor W as given. Then his decision problem
is summarized by
U(γ)=Max c− H(l) subject to c ≤ (1 − γ)Wl
where γ denotes the tax rate on labor income, c consumption, l hours worked,
and H(.) is a smooth, strictly increasing, strictly convex function.
The indirect utility function U(γ) gives the representative worker’s welfare as
a function of the tax rate on labor income. The optimal choice of labor eﬀort will
be denoted by l = l(γ) and given by the ﬁrst order condition
(1 − γ)W = H
0(l(γ))
9Clearly l(γ) is a decreasing function of γ. Finally, the envelope theorem yields
U0(γ)=−Wl(γ) < 0 : intuitively, workers’ welfare falls with labor taxes.
As with R, the return to labor, W, will be taken to be an exogenous constant
for now. Again, this is only for expositional purposes, and section 6 shows that
W can be interpreted as the equilibrium wage in an economy with a neoclassical
production function.
3. Exogenous Electoral Outcomes
This section studies government policy choices and the resulting economic equi-
librium, taking the distribution of the electoral outcome (summarized by p)a s
given. Particular attention is given to conditions under there is positive invest-
ment, as well as the relation between foreign debt and welfare. Also, we identify
the conditions under which the economic equilibrium is of the sudden stop type.
A natural but key assumption is that the winner of the elections can only set
policy after the elections, that is, at the end of period 1.E ﬀectively, this means
that the winning candidate must take as given the number of investment projects
still alive. In addition, I assume that the objectives of each candidate are given
by a weighted average of the welfare of entrepreneurs and workers. However,
the objective function of the pro business candidate assigns a larger weight to
entrepreneurs than the pro labor candidate’s function does. The main consequence
is that, under assumptions spelled out below, a pro labor candidate suﬀers from a
capital levy problem of the type emphasized in the time inconsistency literature.
In contrast, the pro business candidate is assumed to be suﬃciently biased in favor
of investors that he can credibly promise low capital taxes.
3.1. A pro business government
To analyze the decision problem of the pro business government, let α denote
the weight that it assigns to the welfare of entrepreneurs. Since, in a sudden
stop equilibrium, investments are undertaken at t =0and are continued after a
pro business victory in the elections, the pro business government’s problem is to
maximize
αM a x{0,(1 − τ)Rκ − d} +( 1− α)U(γ) (3.1)
subject to
G ≤ τRK+ γWL(γ). (3.2)
10where K = χκ and L(γ)=( 1− χ)l(γ) denote the aggregate amount of capital
and the aggregate labor supply function. The choice variables are the tax rates
τ and γ and assumed, for simplicity, to be restricted to the unit interval. The
government takes the labor supply function L(.), the workers’ welfare function
U(.), the amount of capital K, and the amount of debt d as given.
This problem is standard except for the presence of the foreign debt d in the
objective function. This distortion reﬂects the assumption that the government’s
objectives do not include the well being of foreign investors; however, it makes
little diﬀerence to the solution.
To develop intuition for the solution, suppose that α were equal to χ,t h a ti s ,
that the pro business candidate were to give the same weight to each entrepreneur
and worker. Then, from 3.1, the problem would amount to maximizing
χ(1 − τ)RK +( 1− χ)U (γ)
subject to 3.2.This is a standard public ﬁnance problem: it entails maximizing
average welfare subject to raising enough revenue through capital and labor taxes.
And, crucially, at the time of the government’s decision, labor taxes are distor-
tionary but capital taxes are not, which means that the government will try to
cover its expenditures through capital taxes and avoid labor taxes. But this means
that it could not have been optimal for investments to have continued after the
elections. This is, of course, a typical capital levy problem.
The pro business candidate avoids the capital levy problem, however, under the
natural assumption that α>χ , that is, that he is biased in favor of entrepreneurs.
Under that assumption, which is maintained hereon, the pro business candidate
has a redistributional motive that oﬀsets the capital levy problem, just like Ro-
goﬀ’s (1985) "conservative central banker" solves the time inconsistency problem
in monetary policy.
The formal argument is as follows. In equilibrium, the tax pair chosen by the
pro business government must give domestic entrepreneurs a non zero payoﬀ.U s e
the government budget constraint 3.2 to eliminate τ from the objective, which
c a nt h e nb ew r i t t e na s α
χ
γWL(γ)+( 1− α)U(γ)
up to a constant. This is to be maximized by choice of γ; then τ is given by the
budget constraint 3.2.











11w h i c hm u s tb en e g a t i v ei fα is less than or equal to χ. This conﬁrms that a
government with a low α will suﬀer from the capital levy problem: ex post, that
government will ﬁnd it optimal to ﬁnance as much of G as possible by taxing
capital income. This is not the case under the assumption that α>χ .
To proceed, deﬁne γ∗ to be the labor tax rate at which V 0(.) vanishes.11 Then,
if G ≤ γ∗WL(γ∗), the tax choice 12
τb =0and γb = T(G)
is optimal, where T(z) is the minimum labor tax rate needed to raise z dollars.13
If G>γ ∗WL(γ∗), the optimal choice requires a positive capital tax rate. The
optimal tax on labor is then γ∗ and the tax rate on capital income is given by the
budget constraint 3.2:
γb = γ
∗ and τb =
G − γ∗WL(γ∗)
RK
For the pair (τb,γb) to give entrepreneurs a positive payoﬀ, the following must
hold:
G ≤ χ(Rκ − d)+γ
∗WL(γ
∗) (3.3)
Finally, optimality requires (τb,γb) not to be dominated by tax rates that
give entrepreneurs a zero payoﬀ.L e t(τe,γe) minimize labor taxes subject to the
budget constraint 3.2 and the constraint that entrepreneurs receive a zero payoﬀ.
14Then optimality requires:
α{(1 − τb)Rκ − d} +( 1− α)U(γb) ≥ (1 − α)U(γe) (3.4)
Summarizing, if the pro business candidate wins power, and assuming 3.3 and
3.4 are satisﬁed, taxes will be given by (τb,γb). Entrepreneurial payoﬀ in this
equilibrium is given by (1−τb)Rκ−d and hence, as already mentioned, falls with








12I assume that V is well behaved, so that V increases for γ<γ ∗ and decreases for γ>γ ∗.
This is satisﬁed, for instance, if H is a CRRA function, as I assume in my computations later.
13That is, T(z) is the minimum γ in [0,1] such that γWL(γ)=z. This will be well deﬁned
if γWL(γ) is strictly concave and attains a maximum in (0,1), which I assume. In addition, I
assume that G is below that maximum.
14One can show that τe = G/RK and γe =0if RK ≥ G, and τe =1and γe = T((G−RK))
if not.
123.2. A pro labor government
The pro labor government is assumed to be biased in favor of workers, in the sense
that its objective function puts weight less than χ on the welfare of entrepreneurs.
As already mentioned, this implies that, if the pro labor government arrives to
power and investments are kept alive, the pro labor government will resort to
capital taxes before imposing any labor taxes. But this cannot be an equilibrium
if the after tax return on investment is negative.
Given any positive amount of continuing investment, the capital tax rate cho-
sen by the pro labor government must be at least as large as τe, as deﬁned in
the previous subsection. The reason is that τe is the capital tax rate that min-
imizes labor taxes when all investments are continued; if some investments are
discontinued, minimizing labor taxes will generally require a larger τ.
Hence the after tax return on investment will be negative as long as (1−τe)R<
λ. I assume that this condition holds, which amounts to
G>(R − λ)K (3.5)
If 3.5 holds, the tax rate chosen by a pro labor government will be too large
to warrant the continuation of investment. The only equilibrium outcome in the
event of a pro labor victory must then involve a sudden stop. In that case, the
labor tax rate is determined by the ﬁscal constraint when capital income is zero:
γL = T(G)
and the capital tax rate is any τL such that (1 − τL)R<λ .For concreteness, I
set τL =1 .
Notably, in an equilibrium with positive initial investment, γL will be greater
than or equal to γb. That is, a pro business government delivers at least as
much welfare to workers as a pro labor one (and is strictly better for workers if
government expenditures are suﬃciently large). This is not unexpected, given the
time inconsistency problem faced by the pro labor candidate.15
3.3. Economic Equilibrium and Investment
Given p, an economic equilibrium is deﬁned in the natural way, as a description of
behavior of individual workers, entrepreneurs, and foreign investors, an aggregate
15See e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a discussion.
13economic outcome, and a policy choice for both the pro business government and
the pro labor government such that:
(i) Given policy choices, the behavior of each individual is optimal for him;
(ii) The aggregate economic outcome is that implied by individual behavior;
and
(iii) Given the aggregate outcome, each policy choice is optimal for the respec-
tive kind of government.
If the equilibrium displays sudden stops, as we have argued, 3.5 must hold.
In addition, 3.3 and 3.4 must clearly hold; replacing the amount of debt d by the
expression 2.2, one obtains







p[(1 − τb)R − λ] ≥ (1 + ρ)+p
1 − α
ακ
(U(γe) − U(γb)). (3.7)
The minimum value of p that satisﬁes the last two expressions, say pmin ,i s
the minimum probability of a pro business electoral victory that is consistent with
positive investment. 16
The conclusion is that, if 3.5 holds and p is at least as large as pmin, there is
a sudden stop economic equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, projects do start at
t =0and are continue at t =1if and only if the pro business government wins the
elections. Tax policy is given by (τb,γb) if the pro business candidate is elected,
and by (τL,γL) if the pro labor candidate emerges as the winner.
Our derivation implies that neither (τb,γb) nor (τL,γL) depend on p or d. In
contrast, we have seen that the amount of debt d increases, and entrepreneurial
welfare conditional on a pro business victory falls, if p falls.
It is useful to examine polar cases. If p<p min, the probability of a pro busi-
ness electoral victory is too small to warrant investments to be started. Neither
investment nor capital inﬂows will be observed. If p =1 , on the other hand,
sudden stops are not observable.
Finally, note that pmin depends on parameters of the environment in intuitive
ways. It is smaller, for instance, the larger the bias α of the pro business candidate.
More interestingly, pmin increases with the world interest rate ρ. This reﬂects not
16Notice that these conditions are stronger than 2.3 and have a diﬀerent interpretation: in
particular, 3.7 reﬂects the fact that, if foreign debt is too large, even a pro business government
will be tempted to tax all capital income, as this would aﬀect mostly foreign investors.
14only that the foreign debt is repaid only if there is a pro business victory but
also that a low p implies a larger d, w h i c hi n c r e a s e st h et e m p t a t i o no fe v e nap r o
business government to expropriate capital income.
4. Politico Economic Equilibrium
We are now ready to endogenize p and analyze the joint determination of the
electoral outcome and the economic equilibrium. The crucial step is to recognize
that the probability p of a pro business victory must reﬂect the expectations of
entrepreneurs and workers about the implications of the election for their own
welfare. I will ﬁrst argue that the chances of the pro business candidate must
fall with the amount of the debt, d. But in an economic equilibrium d depends,
in turn, on p. Hence the outcome of this model is naturally given by its politico
economic equilibria, that is, a probability p and an economic equilibrium that are
mutually consistent.
4.1. Voting Preferences and the Debt
Consider the voting decision faced by the typical entrepreneur at the time of
the election. Assuming that his debt contract is consistent with the sudden stop
economic equilibrium of the preceding sections, his ﬁnal consumption will be zero if
the pro labor candidate wins, but (1−τb)Rκ−d if the pro business candidate is the
winner. Hence the relative appeal of the pro business candidate to entrepreneurs
falls with the debt d. The intuition is that, while the typical entrepreneur is
always better oﬀ with a pro business government than with a pro labor one, a
larger debt means that more of the beneﬁts from a pro business victory are lost
as compensation to foreign investors.
As for workers, their ﬁnal consumption is U(γb) after a pro business victory and
U(γL) after a pro labor victory. As seen in the previous section, these quantities
depend only on exogenous parameters. Hence the voting preferences of a typical
worker are not aﬀected by the debt.
If the likelihood that each agent votes for the pro business candidate increases
with that agent’s payoﬀ under a pro business administration relative to his payoﬀ
under a pro labor administration, then the probability of a pro business victory
in the election must decrease with the debt d, that is
p = Ψ(d) (4.1)
15where Ψ is a decreasing function which will generally depend on the model’s
parameters and takes values in the unit interval. Such a function can be in fact
derived from more basic assumptions, as we do in the next subsection.
A politico economic equilibrium can be now deﬁned as a probability p and an
economic equilibrium given p such that p is given by 4.1, where the debt d is
determined by the economic equilibrium.
Now it is straightforward to characterize politico economic equilibria in which
sudden stops may happen. Recall that, in a sudden stop economic equilibrium,
the debt d is a function of p (recall 2.2). Using this fact in the preceding equation,
we see that p must satisfy the equation





A ﬁxed point of Γ that lies in the interval [pmin,1] identiﬁes a sudden stop
politico economic equilibrium.
The existence of an equilibrium depends on the shape of the function Γ.E x -
istence is guaranteed, in particular, if Γ is continuous on [pmin,1], Γ(1) < 1, and
Γ(pmin) ≥ pmin. Whether these conditions hold depend on implicit or explicit as-
sumptions about voting behavior. For instance, under deterministic voting, that
is, if each agent votes for the candidate that maximizes his economic welfare,
then Γ must exhibit jumps. On the other hand, assuming that voting behavior is
probabilistic easily ensures the continuity of Γ; hence we shall assume probabilis-
tic voting in the next subsection. The assumption that Γ(1) < 1 is the weakest
of the three. It means that even under the strongest possible degree of investor
optimism about the electoral outcome, so that the cost of foreign credit (as de-
ﬁned in section 2) is equal to the international interest rate, a pro business victory
in the elections cannot be a sure bet. On the other hand, the assumption that
Γ(pmin) ≥ pmin seems relatively strong. It says that if investors are pessimistic and
the cost of foreign credit is high, the chances of a pro business electoral victory
must be suﬃciently large. In eﬀect, this requires the pro business candidate to
have enough support independently of the size of the debt.
If Γ(pmin) <p min fails, there may or may not be an equilibrium. But if there is
an equilibrium, and the other two assumptions on Γ hold, then there must be more
than one. More generally, it is easy to see that equilibrium need not be unique,
since Γ is an increasing function and can cut the 45 degree line several times in
the interval [pmin,1]. The intuition is simple. If investors are pessimistic about the
16chances of a pro business victory, the debt d will increase. As I have argued, this
makes the pro labor candidate relatively more attractive, and leads to a reduction
in p, which can be self fulﬁlling. Observe that if there are multiple equilibria, the
size of the debt, the electoral outcome, the cost of credit, and economic welfare
are all subject to the volatility of market psychology.
4.2. Probabilistic Voting
One way to derive the political outcome function Γ is suggested by Persson and
Tabellini’s (2000) discussion of probabilistic voting. In particular, assume that a
given entrepreneur, labeled i, votes pro business if
(1 − τb)Rκ − d ≥ δ + ηi (4.3)
where δ is an aggregate shock, common to all entrepreneurs, and σi is an inde-
pendent, idiosyncratic shock, distributed i.i.d. across entrepreneurs. The inter-
pretation is the following: the LHS is the diﬀerence between the economic payoﬀ
that the entrepreneur receives, in equilibrium, after a pro business victory, and his
payoﬀ after a pro labor victory (which is zero). The RHS represents the eﬀect of
other considerations, not explicitly modeled, that aﬀects the relative popularity
of the two candidates. With this speciﬁcation, the number of entrepreneurs that
vote pro business, given d and δ, is χQ((1−τb)Rκ−d−δ), where Q is the cdf of
ηi.
Workers could be modeled in a similar fashion. However, the electoral outcome
only aﬀects workers through the tax rates γb and γL, which do not depend on p
or d. Hence one can just assume that each worker votes pro business with some
ﬁxed probability s.
Now, assuming majority rule,the pro business candidate wins the elections if
the number of pro business votes exceeds one half of the population, that is,
χQ((1 − τb)Rκ − d − δ)+( 1− χ)s>0.5
Let ¯ δ be the value of δ that yields equality in the previous expression (note
that ¯ δ depends on d and hence on p). Then, given p, the probability of a pro
business victory, Γ(p), is just the probability that δ ≤ ¯ δ, which is easily calculated
after specifying a cdf for δ.
174.3. Implications for Volatility and Crises
It is now straightforward to solve the model after assigning values to its parame-
ters. One could, in principle, calibrate or estimate the parameters on the basis of
empirical data. Given the limitations of the model, however, I believe that such
as attempt would be premature. Instead, I discuss some elementary computations
to illustrate the qualitative behavior of the model. For example, Figure 3 plots
Γ as a function of p on the interval [pmin,1] for a benchmark set of parameters.
17 There is a single politico economic equilibrium is given by point A, where Γ
intersects the 45 degree line.
To assess the impact of adverse external shocks, Figure 4 depicts the implica-
tions of an increase in the world interest rate ρ.18 The graph of Γ shifts downwards
because a larger ρ increases the debt d for any p, which reduces the relative en-
trepreneurial payoﬀ of a pro business government, and makes the pro business
candidate less attractive in the elections. The new equilibrium is given by point
B.
Figure 4 helps stressing that the change from point A to point B reﬂects the
interaction of ﬁnancial forces and political forces. If ﬁnancial contracts did not
react to the increase in ρ,t h ee ﬀect on the equilibrium would simply be given by a
shift from A to A’. The height of A’ would then reﬂect the new, lower probability
of a pro business electoral victory. But now we know that a fall in that probability
will increase the cost of credit and the debt d, which itself will push p down even
more, and so on. Such a chain reaction is given by the shift from A’ to B.
Hence the interaction between ﬁnance and politics implies the existence of
multiplier eﬀects that magnify the impact of exogenous shocks to the economy.
17The MATLAB programs that produce Figures 3, 4, and 5 are available on request. In
Figure 3, the world interest rate (ρ)i st w op e r c e n t ,R is 2.8, and λ i so n e . T h es i z eo ft h e
initial investment, κ, is normalized to one. The entrepreneurial class is set to 20 percent of
the population, while α is set to 80 percent. Government expenditure G is set to 0.4. Workers’
preferences are given by the function H, which I assume to be of the CRRA form l1+ν/(1 +ν);
the benchmark value of ν is 2. Finally, I choose W to be 1.2 times the minimum value that would
equate G and the maximum revenue from labor taxes. This is just to simplify computations, as
it ensures that G can in fact be ﬁnanced with only labor taxes. Given these parameter values,
τb =0 , while γb = γL =0 .368. Also, pmin =0.61.
Finally, Figure 3 assumes that ηi is normal, with mean zero and standard deviation equal to
8 percent of Rκ. δ is also assumed to be normal with mean zero and standard deviation equal
to 20 percent of Rκ.Finally, s =0 .58.
At A, p =0 .952, with an implied cost of credit of 7.1 percent.
18In Figure 4, ρ increases to 8 percent.
18Such multiplier eﬀects may help account for the apparent volatility of emerging
economies in electoral periods.
In fact, under some conditions, the reaction of the economy to exogenous
shocks may be even more violent than that suggested by Figure 4. This is illus-
trated by Figure 5, that summarizes the equilibrium implications of an increase in
the interest rate ρ under slightly diﬀerent parameter assumptions. 19 The initial
equilibrium is given by point A. As in Figure 4, and for the same reasons, the
higher interest rate pushes the graph of Γ downwards. Here, however, not only
the initial equilibrium shifts to B, but a second equilibrium, given by C, emerges
and implies a much lower value of p, and consequently a much higher debt and
cost of credit, than at B.
The lesson is that, even if an increase in the world interest rate has moderate
eﬀects on economic and political outcomes when the economy remains in a "good"
equilibrium, it may also have catastrophic eﬀects, if the shock results in a shift to
an e wa n ds i g n i ﬁcantly worse equilibrium. One can interpret such a shift between
equilibria as a politico economic self fulﬁlling crisis.20 Again, these implications
reﬂect the interaction between electoral uncertainty and the debt.
Finally, one of the advantages of assuming probabilistic voting is that it allows
for the introduction of purely political shocks in a natural way, by changing the
variances of the shocks δ, ηi,o rt h ev a l u eo fs. In this model, such shocks aﬀect
not only p but also economic variables in a straightforward way. For example, an
increase in the standard deviation of the aggregate shock to voting, δ, results in
a downward shift of Γ, as in Figures 4 and 5. Intuitively, a higher variance in δ
makes entrepreneurs less likely to base their votes only on economic payoﬀs; this
favors the pro labor candidate. The qualitative eﬀect is similar to that of a higher
world interest rate depicted in Figures 4 and 5.
Summarizing, sudden stop equilibria imply that the economy’s reaction to
shocks may be magniﬁed by the interaction between politics and ﬁnancial con-
tracts. Self fulﬁlling politico economic crises are possible. And politico economic
outcomes change in response to not only economic but also purely political shocks.
19In Figure 4, ρ changes from zero to seven percent. The other change is on the distribution
of political noise. The standard deviation of δ is 18 percent of Rκ and s falls to 0.5.
20See Paul Masson (1999) for a discussion of such an interpretation.
195. Policy Aspects
The welfare analysis of this model is complicated by the heterogeneity of the
population and the existence of several distortions. On the other hand, it is
clear that equilibria that display the sudden stop phenomena cannot be eﬃcient:
with positive probability, the domestic investment is initiated but is discontinued.
This is a response, essentially, to the pro labor candidate’s inability to commit
not to expropriate capital income if elected. One would guess, therefore, that
superior outcomes may be attainable under policies that alleviate this commitment
problem. I will argue that such a conjecture is valid, as one should have expected
from the literature on time inconsistency. On the other hand, the model yields new
insights, in particular that such policies may have a signiﬁcant and predictable
eﬀect on electoral outcomes.
To begin, suppose that, before the elections, the two candidates agree on a
common tax policy to be implemented at the end of period 1, independently of who
is the winner.21 Assuming that the agreement is perfectly credible, entrepreneurs
and foreign investors no longer face any uncertainty about taxes. And if the tax
policy is such that the after tax return on the investment is proﬁtable, that is,
[(1 − τ)R − λ] ≥ 1+ρ (5.1)
then the investment will take place and continued with probability one: no sudden
stops would be observed. To participate in the investment, it is enough for foreign
lenders to be repaid d =[ λ +( 1+ρ)]κ: the cost of credit would fall to the world
rate of interest.
Hence a commitment to a common tax policy before the elections may re-
move the ineﬃciency associated with sudden stops in investment. The intuition
is essentially the same as in the literature on time inconsistency: the agreement
eliminates the commitment problem of the pro labor candidate. Note that, for
this argument, one does not need to specify the exact tax agreement, as long as
taxes respect 5.1 and the ﬁscal budget constraint. Since the exact choice of taxes
would have distributional consequences, they would presumably be determined by
negotiations between the two electoral candidates.
What is not e v i d e n tf r o mp r e v i o u sl i t e r a t u r ei st h a tt h et a xc o m m i t m e n tw o u l d
have nontrivial consequences on the electoral outcome. From the viewpoint of vot-
ers, the results of the elections would no longer imply diﬀerent economic outcomes,
21A prominent example of such an agreement is given by the Korean 1997-98 electoral period.
See Haggard (2000) for a discussion.
20and hence candidates would be seen as more equal to each other. In the prob-
abilistic model of subsection 4.2, in particular, the typical entrepreneur’s ﬁnal
payoﬀ would no longer depend on who wins the election. Hence he would act as
if the LHS of 4.3 were zero; the implication would be a greater likelihood of a pro
labor victory.
Other policies aimed at alleviating the pro labor candidate’s inability to com-
mit to low capital taxes can be analyzed in a similar way. As suggested by the
time inconsistency literature, such policies may improve economic outcomes and,
in our model, lead to a lower cost of credit and more stable capital ﬂows. But here
they also aﬀect political equilibria: in our model, they will generally favor the pro
labor candidate. This ﬁnding is particularly relevant and provides justiﬁcation
for the view, often associated with the political left, that international ﬁnancial
packages not only aﬀect the economy but may also have a signiﬁcant impact on
domestic politics as well. But my analysis suggests that leftist candidates are not
hurt but, on the contrary, beneﬁt politically from those packages.22
The same reasoning implies that leftist candidates would be well served by
ﬁnding ways to overcome their commitment problems. In so doing, they would
beneﬁt the population at large but also, and much less obviously, enhance their
own chances at being elected. 23
Conversely, the analysis implies that the pro business candidate’s electoral
chances will be hurt by the policies under discussion. This suggests that it may
be diﬃcult for the two candidates to reach an agreement with regard to such
policies, which may help explain why the policies are not observed often.
22The impact of the August 2002 support package to Brazil on the upcoming elections was
quickly recognized but poorly understood. Clearly, the leftist candidates (Lula da Silva and
Gomes) were more negative about the package than the oﬃcial candidate (Serra):"Both of the
leading candidates are chaﬁng at what they perceive as an intrusion on Brazil’s sovereignty and
on their ability to fulﬁll campaign promises." (Brazilians ﬁns political cost for help from IMF,
The New York Times, August 11, page A3).
23Thus, for instance, Lula da Silva’s 2002 pre electoral pledges that he would pursue "market
friendly" policies can be seen not only as an attempt to appease international investors but also
as a way to increase his probability of victory.
216. Extensions
6.1. Neoclassical Production
We have so far assumed that the ﬁnal return on investment, R, and the return
to working, W, are exogenous constants. But it is not too hard to extend the
analysis to allow for R and W to be determined as equilibrium factor rewards in
an economy with a neoclassical production function.
To do this, let us assume now that neither entrepreneurs nor workers produce
goods directly. Instead, at the end of period 1, entrepreneurs sell the services of
whatever capital they have accumulated, and workers sell labor, in competitive
f a c t o rm a r k e t si nw h i c ht h er e n t a lr a t eo fc a p i t a li sR and the wage rate is W.
Production of the single good takes place at the end of period 1 in a competitive
sector in which aggregate output is given by
Y = F(K,L)=Lf(k)
where F denotes a neoclassical production function, k = K/L, and f is the
intensive production function.24 Recall that K and L denote the aggregate values
of capital and labor after the elections. Our focus remains on a sudden stop
equilibria, in which K = χκ if the pro business candidate wins the elections, and
K =0if the pro labor candidate is the winner.




W = f(k) − kf
0(k) (6.1)
On the other hand, labor supply is determined by
H
0(L/(1 − χ)) = (1 − γ)W (6.2)
where γ is the labor tax rate. Now 6.1 and 6.2 jointly determine the equilibrium
wage and the aggregate labor supply, given γ and K.
In a sudden stop equilibrium, γ will equal γb or γL depending on the electoral
outcome. Also, K will equal χκ after a pro business victory and 0 after a pro
labor victory. Hence factor rewards, in addition to labor eﬀort, will depend on
24f : R+ → R+ is assumed to be smooth, strictly increasing and strictly concave.
22the electoral outcome. This is the main change with respect to the case in which
R and W are constant. However, the analysis is essentially the same.
If the pro business candidate wins the elections, his decision problem is still
to maximize 3.1 subject to 3.2, except that now W and l(γ) are given by 6.1 and
6.2, given K = χκ. Following the same steps as in section 3.1 one can show that
the pro business candidate overcomes the capital levy problem only if α>χ .The
reason is, of course, the same as in the simpler case: at the time taxes are set,
labor taxes are distortionary but capital taxes are not.
Because W and R are now endogenous, the solution is now more complicated
than before. For concreteness, focus on the case in which τb =0 (this must be
the solution if α is suﬃciently close to one). In that case, the labor tax rate γb is
determined by 6.1 , 6.2, and the government budget constraint:
G = γWL (6.3)
with K = χκ. If the solution is denoted by (Wb,L b,γb), then the capital rental
rate after a pro business electoral victory is given by f0(χκ/Lb). This quantity
plays the same role as R did in the simpler version of the model.25
If the pro labor candidate wins the election, the capital levy problem implies
that τL =1 , that is, that any capital income will be expropriated. Anticipating
this, all investment projects are discontinued, and K =0 . This implies that the
wage falls to WL = f(0). Then the labor supply, LL, and the labor tax rate, γL,
are determined by 6.2 and 6.3. 26
Having identiﬁed post election outcomes, the rest of the analysis proceeds
essentially without change. The main novelty is that the capital levy problem
of the pro labor candidate becomes worse. One can show that if the pro labor
c a n d i d a t ew i n st h ee l e c t i o n ,t h el a b o rt a xr a t ei sh i g h e r ,a n dt h ew a g er a t ea n d
the worker’s after tax income smaller, than under a pro business victory. This is
because capital vanishes after a pro labor victory, and because capital and labor
are complementary inputs in production.
25In particular, for investment to get oﬀ the ground it is necessary that p(R − λ)=
p(f0(χκ/Lb) − λ) ≥ (1 + ρ). This replaces 3.7 and 3.6 for α large enough.
26Note that the existence of this kind of equilibrium requires that there be enough potential
labor tax revenue to ﬁnance G. It is necessary, in particular, that f(0) > 0, that is, that capital
be not essential in production.
Also, the condition 3.5 is replaced by G/χκ > Re −λ, where Re is the equilibrium rental rate
if K = χκ and γ =0 .
236.2. A Distribution of Types
We have kept a strict distinction between classes: some agents are entrepreneurs,
others workers. But our analysis also applies to settings in which the diﬀerences
are not so sharp. Here we will assume that, instead of having workers and en-
trepreneurs, the economy is populated by a continuum of agents, each of which is
both an entrepreneur and a worker. This version turns out to be useful to assess
the eﬀects of wealth inequality and redistribution on politico economic outcomes.
As mentioned in the Introduction, this question is of interest since it has been
argued that the increase in politico economic volatility in Latin America can be
blamed on persistent inequality.
Assume that all agents are identical except for the size of their projects, κ,
and it will prove convenient to index agents by κ.A t y p i c a l a g e n t κ has access
t oap r o j e c to fﬁxed size κ. T h ei n v e s t m e n tt e c h n o l o g yi st h es a m ea si nt h eb a s i c
model. So, in a sudden stop equilibrium, agent κ borrows κ dollars from the world
market. If the pro business candidate wins the elections, the project is continued
(at cost λκ), and at the end of period 1 it yields Rκ dollars, out of which taxes
and the foreign debt must be repaid; if the pro labor candidate is the election
winner, the project is just cancelled. In addition, and regardless of the election
outcome, at the end of period 1 agent κ also works l(κ) hours, earning Wl(κ)
dollars, and must pay labor taxes. For simplicity, we restore the assumption that
R and W are both constant.
Project size, κ, is distributed according to a cdf F :[ 0 ,∞) → [0,1] ,w i t h
density f. F(κ) can be interpreted as the fraction of the population with project
size equal to or less than κ.
Finally, I assume that agent κ maximizes the expected value of c(κ)−H(l(κ)),
as in subsection 6.2, where the ﬁnal consumption of agent κ is
c(κ)=( 1− γb)Wl(κ)+( 1− τb)Rκ − d(κ)
if the pro business wins the election, and
c(κ)=( 1− γL)Wl(κ)
if the pro labor government wins the election.
This setting reduces to the basic one because the labor supply decision is sep-
arable from the investment decision. Regardless of the electoral outcome, optimal
labor supply is given by the maximization of c(κ) − H(l(κ)) subject to relevant
one of the two previous equations. The solution requires:
(1 − γ)W = H
0(l(κ))
24just as in the basic model. Hence l(κ) is equal to the same l(γ) in subsection 2.2,
independently of κ. In other words, the labor supply decision depends only on
the labor tax rate, so all agents supply the same amount of labor. It also follows
that agent κ0s r e a l i z e dw e l f a r ei sg i v e nb y
U(γb)+( 1− τb)Rκ − d(κ)
if the pro business candidate wins the election, and U(γL) in the alternative case,
where U(.) is the same as in subsection 2.2.
Since labor supply depends only on the labor tax rate and utility is linear in
ﬁnal consumption, the analysis of the investment project can be treated separately
and its solution is the same as in subsection 2.1.27 In particular, agent κ0s debt








Now, consider the policy problem of the pro business candidate if elected. Let
α(κ) denote the weight of agents of type κ in his objective function. Then his
problem is to maximize:
Z
[U(γ)+( 1− τ)Rκ − d(κ)]α(κ)dκ
subject to





is the aggregate amount of capital, and we have used the fact that the aggregate
labor supply is l(γ).
It is easy to see that the solution to the maximization problem is unchanged
if the objective function is replaced by
β(1 − τ)RK +( 1− β)U(γ)
27The assumption of limited liability here means that labor income cannot be expropriated
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is an aggregate of capital weighted by the candidate’s policy preferences.
Now a comparison of the resulting maximization problem with that in section
3 reveals that the two problems are essentially the same, with β am e a s u r eo f
the policy bias of the pro business candidate. 28 Here, the capital levy problem
emerges if β ≤ 1/2. So a sudden stop equilibrium requires that β>1/2,a n d
that the pro labor candidate have a bias in the opposite direction. Under that
assumption, the analysis of section 3 applies virtually without change.
Note that β>1/2 is equivalent to ˜ K>K ,which requires α(.) to dominate
f(.) stochastically to ﬁrst order. In other words, β>1/2 means that the objective
function of the pro business candidate must assign disproportionately large weight
to wealthier agents (those with larger project sizes).
The analysis of this version of the model, hence, is basically the same as in the
original version. However, this version allows one to consider the eﬀects of wealth
redistribution on a politico economic equilibrium.
Consider the eﬀects of a mean preserving spread in the distribution of project
size, f. Such a change does not aﬀect K nor β, and consequently the individual
decision problems (as analyzed in section 2) and the policy problems of the two
candidates (as studied in section 3) remain also unaltered, given p. The economic
equilibria for given p must then be the same. So, if the mean preserving spread
is to change the politico economic equilibrium, it must be because of its eﬀect on
the voting function Γ(p) discussed in section 4.
Assume probabilistic voting, as in subsection 4.2. Then agent κ votes pro
business if
(1 − τb)Rκ − d(κ)+U(γb) − U(γL)
=[ ( 1 − τb)R − λ −
(1 + ρ)
p
]κ + U(γb) − U(γL) ≥ δ + ηκ
28More precisely, the ratio ˜ K/K plays the role of the ratio α(1 − χ)/χ(1 − α) in the basic
model.
26If Q is the cdf of ηκ, given δ, the probability that agent κ votes pro business
is Λ(κ) ≡ Q([(1 − τb)R − λ − (1 + ρ)/p]κ + U(γb) − U(γL) − δ). Hence, given δ,
the pro business candidate wins the election if
Z
Λ(κ)f(κ)dκ > 0.5
Since Λ is linear and increasing in κ, a mean preserving spread of f reduces the
RHS of the preceding inequality if Λ is concave, which requires Q to be concave.
In such a case, clearly the voting function Γ(p) must shift downwards. If the initial
politico economic equilibrium is given by a unique ﬁxed point of Γ, as in Figure
3, the mean preserving spread will reduce the equilibrium value of p, and increase
the cost of external credit and the foreign debt.
This analysis shows that an increase in wealth inequality (a mean preserving
spread in the distribution of project size) may be associated with both more expen-
sive foreign credit and an increase in the probability of a pro labor victory. Hence
it provides some justiﬁcation for recent claims. However, the analysis also makes
clear that such a conclusion is sensitive to assumptions about the distribution of
exogenous political noise. The opposite result obtains if Q is convex.
7. Final Remarks
This paper has shown that a model in which international capital ﬂows aﬀect
and are aﬀected by electoral uncertainty delivers signiﬁcant implications for ob-
servable variables and for policy. In particular, such an interaction may result in
sudden stops, magniﬁed responses to exogenous shocks, and self fulﬁlling crises
at electoral times. Policies that allow electoral candidates to pre commit not to
expropriate capital returns do stabilize capital inﬂows, but also have predictable
eﬀects on electoral outcomes. Reducing wealth inequality has ambiguous although
predictable eﬀects on the politico economic equilibria.
The analysis is consistent with the belief that ﬁnancial instability is most likely
to be observed in emerging economies. A country in which investment prospects
are too poor or the political structure too adverse to markets will not receive any
foreign funds. At the other extreme, if there is enough political stability, in the
sense that policy is expected to be favorable to investment regardless of electoral
outcomes, capital inﬂo w sw i l lb es t r o n ga n ds t a b l e .T h em o d e lt h u ss u g g e s t st h a t
ﬁnancial ﬂows may display marked volatility as a country develops politically.
But we also found that the political development process may itself be aﬀected
27by ﬁnancial volatility. One interesting avenue for research may be to study such
a politico-economic interaction in a truly dynamic model of development and
growth. Such a dynamic extension would also make the model more amenable
to empirical calibration or estimation, and therefore enhance its applicability to
speciﬁc, real world episodes. On the other hand, extending the analysis of this
paper to multiperiod settings would require dealing with issues, such as the role
of reputation, that may be cumbersome or intrinsically hard.
Another useful extension of this paper would be to allow for public debt and
its determination. By just reinterpreting G a st h ea m o u n to fg o v e r n m e n td e b t
repayments due, the model in this paper can be used to discuss the impact of
a large public debt. Such a reinterpretation, however, would not be helpful to
understand how the incumbent government chose the size of the public debt in the
ﬁrst place, and how that choice may have interacted with electoral considerations.
Perhaps one could gain some mileage by merging the analysis in this paper with
the literature on the strategic role of public debt, as discussed by Drazen (2000)
or Persson and Tabellini (2000).
More generally, the model in this paper was built upon a number of strong
assumptions, some of which may be peripheral (like the ones discussed in section
6), but others crucial. Examining which ones are which appears as a fascinating
agenda for future research.
28References
[1] Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James Robinson and Yunyong
Thaicharoen. "Institutional Causes, Macroeconomic Symptoms: Volatility,
Crises And Growth," Journal of Monetary Economics 50 (2003), 49-123.
[2] Bussiere, Matthieu, and Christian Mulder, "Political Instability and Eco-
nomic Vulnerability," IMF Working Paper 99/46, 1999.
[3] Calvo, Guillermo. Capital Flows and Capital-Market Crises: The Simple
Economics of Sudden Stops. Working Paper, University of Maryland, 1998
[4] Chang, Roberto. "Financial Crises and Political Crises." NBER Working Pa-
per 11779, 2005.
[5] Drazen, Allan. Political Economy in Macroeconomics. Princeton University
Press, 2000.
[6] Haggard, Stephan. The Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis. In-
stitute for International Economics, 2000.
[7] Masson, Paul. "Multiple Equilibria, Contagion, and the Emerging Market
Crises. " IMF Working Paper WP/94/164, November 1999.
[8] Oganes, Luis, and Andres Ortiz. "Peru Elections: A Bumpy Ride Once
Again." Emerging Markets Research, J.P Morgan Securities, December 2005.
[9] Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. Political Economics. MIT Press, 2000.
[10] Rogoﬀ, Kenneth. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate
Target." Quarterly Journal of Economics 100 (1985), 1169-90
[11] Santiso, Javier. The Political Economy of Emerging Markets. Palgrave, 2003
29Brazil EMBI Spread
Global EMBI


































9-Nov-04 17-Feb-05 28-May-05 5-Sep-05 14-Dec-05 24-Mar-06 2-Jul-06 10-Oct-06
Figure 2: EMBI Peru Minus EMBI Global, 2005-6
Humala
leads polls





























A'0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
Figure 5
p
Γ
(
p
)
A
B
C